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Since the Supreme Court first held political redistricting1 to be justicia-
ble in Baker v. Carr,2 legal challenges to districting plans have increased
dramatically.3 Because the Court's 1986 decision in Davis v. Bandemer4
held partisan gerrymandering5 to be justiciable for the first time,6 even
more litigation will likely accompany redistricting following the 1990 cen-
1. States are divided into geographical districts from which representatives are elected either for
the United States House of Representatives or for state legislative bodies. Political redistricting occurs
when states redraw their political boundary lines after each decennial census. Since the benefits and
detriments of automated redistricting apply equally to both congressional and state legislative redis-
triting, this Note will not distinguish between them. The Supreme Court, however, does treat chal-
lenges to the two types of districts differently, applying tighter standards of population equality to
congressional districts than to state legislative districts. Compare Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725
(1983) (invalidating plan for New Jersey's congressional districts with average deviation from perfect
population equality of 0.1384%) with Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983) (upholding plan for
Wyoming state legislature with maximum population deviation of 89%).
2. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In Baker, the Court held that a challenge to the disparity of population
size in districts of the Tennessee General Assembly was justiciable under the equal protection clause,
U.S. CoN sT. amend XIV, § 1. A previous challenge to the lack of population equality in districts in
Illinois had been held nonjusticiable when it was brought under the guaranty clause, U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 4 (guaranteeing republican form of government to each state). See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549 (1946).
3. E.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983); Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983);
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (upholding plan for state legislative districts with small
deviations from population equality); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969) (requiring
that "State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality" of population in redis-
tricting); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding that populations in congressional districts
must be as equal as practicable); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (enunciating "one man, one
vote" standard in case regarding redistricting of state legislatures).
4. 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality opinion).
5. "Gerrymandering" is "the process of dividing a state... with such a geographical arrangement
as to accomplish an ulterior or unlawful purpose, as, for instance, to secure a majority for a given
political party in districts where the result would be otherwise if they were divided according to
obvious natural lines." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 618 (5th ed. 1979).
6. The Bandemer case involved the 1981 redistricting of the Indiana state legislature. Indiana
Democrats challenged the state redistricting plan enacted while Republicans controlled the Indiana
House, Senate, and Governorship. In resolving the case, the Supreme Court held for the first time
that "political gerrymandering cases are properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause." 478
U.S. at 143 (plurality opinion). But the Court went on to find that the evidence did not support the
Democrats' claim that unconstitutional gerrymandering had occurred. Id.
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sus.' Indeed, some commentators expect that every redistricting plan cre-
ated after 1990 will face a court challenge.8
The fact that redistricting cases have tended to proliferate over time
rather than to disappear suggests problems in the Court's adjudication of
political redistricting cases.9 Additionally, the fact that redistricting plans
are challenged continually suggests either dissatisfaction with the results
of the current method of redistricting, or displeasure with the process of
redistricting itself, irrespective of judicial problems. Based on recent con-
demnations of political redistricting,10 this Note proposes a reexamination
of the suggestion, first discussed in the 1960's," that automated computer
models 2 be developed for use in redistricting. 13
Most previous articles on automated redistricting have proposed com-
puter models without explaining their unique political and legal signifi-
cance. 14 This Note hopes to fill a gap in the literature by demonstrating
7. See Brace & Katosh, Redistricting Lawsuits Will Be A Neu, Growth Industry, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 29, § 1986, § 1, at 16, col. 3; see also Comment, Politics and Purpose: Hide and Seek in the
Gerryinandering Thicket After Davis v. Bandemer, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 183, 186 (1987) ("inability of
the [Republican and Democratic] parties to agree on the decision's ramifications foreshadows a litig-
ious future").
8. Schmidt, Neu, Age of Gerrynandering: Political Magic by Computer?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10,
1989, at Al, col. 5, A14, col. 3 (" 'rule of thumb this time around is that every reapportionment plan
will probably end up in some courtroom' " (quoting Jeffrey Wice, counsel for Democratic State Leg-
islative Leaders Association)); High-Tech Vote Grabbing, Wall St. J., May 12, 1989, at A14, col. 1.
9. Cf Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legis-
lative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 125, 149 (footnote omitted):
If the principles of law declared in an opinion are recognized as dispositive, the Court's state-
ment of the law will stand, literally unchallenged. On the other hand, if people continue to
litigate, and lawyers and courts continue to have doubts about how these cases should be re-
solved, the Supreme Court is eventually moved to reexamine its previous statement of the law.
10. See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. The possibility that these condemnations may
not be well-founded does not refute the need for a change in the redistricting process. People's percep-
tions of problems in the political arena can be important whether or not these "problems" are real,
and automated redistricting can counter both real and perceived problems in the current state of
political redistricting. Cf Elliott, The Future of Toxic Torts: Of Chemophobia, Risk as a Compensa-
ble Injury and Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25 Hous. L. REV. 781, 793 (1988) ("in politics,
appearances are reality"); Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283,
1308 n.132 (1984) (authored by Akhil Amar) (risk of appearance of manipulation in lottery voting is
as significant as risk of actual manipulation).
11. See, e.g., Nagel, Simplified Bipartisan Computer Redistricting, 17 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1965)
(describing computer program implementing redistricting algorithm); Weaver & Hess, A Procedure
for Nonpartisan Districting: Development of Computer Techniques, 73 YALE L.J. 288 (1963)
(describing computer program implementing redistricting algorithm based on mathematical techniques
of operations research).
12. For an explanation of automated computer models, see infra Section II.
13. Despite the dearth of articles written in favor of automated redistricting since the 1970's, most
scholarship on political redistricting still acknowledges, either explicitly or implicitly, such a possible
role for computers in redistricting. See, e.g., Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Per-
spective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 124-25 (1985); Schuck, The Thickest Thicket. Partisan Gernman-
dering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1352 n.110 (1987).
14. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 11; Torricelli & Porter, Towards the 1980 Census: The Reap-
portionnient of New Jersey's Congressional Districts, 7 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS TECH. & L. 135,
148-56 (1979) (proposing use of Apportionment Commission and computer techniques to redistrict
New Jersey fairly after 1980 census); Weaver & Hess, supra note 11. Torricelli and Porter do point
out briefly that "[tihe proper use of computers can guarantee ... a fair and effective vote by drawing
the most compact and contiguous districts possible." Torricelli & Porter, supra, at 141.
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how automated redistricting offers a unique opportunity to make the re-
districting process reviewable by the voting public and the courts. This
reviewability should make it possible to require redistricting to meet man-
ageable, meaningful judicial standards. 15 Computer models might also ele-
vate the legislative redistricting debate from a battle over line drawing to a
discussion of representational goals. The potential for review, and the
traits which flow from that, make an automated solution, while no pan-
acea, a significant improvement over the current state of redistricting.
Section I of the Note describes some of the characteristics of the politi-
cal redistricting problem, including current dissatisfaction and proposed
alternatives. Section II outlines the type of computer model envisioned by
the term "automated redistricting." Section III discusses why computer-
ized redistricting should not only meet the standards elucidated by the
Supreme Court in previous case law, but also provide the Court with a
means of developing meaningful, judicially manageable standards for de-
termining unconstitutional gerrymanders. Section IV argues that the pro-
cess-oriented focus inherent in automated redistricting may create an in-
tent/effect dichotomy in the determination of gerrymanders, and Section
V describes past successful experiences with the use of mathematical
methods in voting problems.
I. POLITICAL REDISTRICTING: PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS
A. Problems: The Redistricting Process
Since Reynolds v. Sins'6 and its progeny clarified the "one person, one
vote" standard for political redistricting, states have been forced to redraw
congressional boundary lines after each decennial census. 7 State legisla-
tures are responsible for political redistricting, and legislators now have
the opportunity to redesign boundary lines for their own political interests
every ten years.'" It is not unreasonable to presume that many of the dis-
15. One of the most valuable features of the process-oriented approach to redistricting afforded by
an automated procedure is its capacity to provide meaningful standards for judicial analysis. See infra
notes 41, 71-73 and accompanying text.
In contrast, current non-process-oriented judicial analyses of redistricting plans often provide stan-
dards which are not manageable. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 162 (1986) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The plurality . . . fails to enunciate standards by which
to determine whether a legislature has enacted an unconstitutional gerrymander.").
Alternatively, present judicially manageable redistricting standards are often not meaningful. See
ginerallv Note, Reapportionment: A Call for a Con-sistent Quantitative Standard, 70 IOWA L. REV.
663, 680-84 (1985) (claiming that Court's application of different quantitative standards to state and
congressional districts lacks constitutional or practical justification). Or else these manageable stan-
dards only appear to be meaningful. See infra text accompanying notes 59-62; see also R. VON
JHLRING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW xiv-xvi (J. Lalor trans. 1879) (arguing that "back door" ap-
proach to resolution of lawsuits is contemptible).
16. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
17. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970s: THE PROBLEMS
OF COMPLIANCE 10 (1971).
18. See, e.g., Fein, Stain on the Electoral Process, Wash. Times, Sept. 5, 1989, at Cl, col. 1
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trict lines are drawn for the benefit of politicians, rather than for the con-
stituents they represent.19 And while the results of redistricting may be
held up to the scrutiny of the courts,2" politicians have not been held ac-
countable thus far for the process of redistricting.2
Many critics have found fault with both gerrymandering and the adju-
dication of redistricting cases. While the "anti-democratic practice of ger-
rymandering"2 has been blamed for distorting the results of elections23
("Through the employment of sophisticated computers, software and polling data, state legislators
cleverly draw congressional boundaries around voter residences to accomplish re-election aspirations
or party entrenchment."). For specific examples of the redistricting procedures undertaken by legisla-
tors, see Fund, Beware the Gerrymander, My Son, NAT'L REV., Apr. 7, 1989, at 34 (describing steps
leading to Phil Burton's well-known gerrymander of California's redistricting plan):
Through many warm nights that summer of '81, Burton held court at a back-room table in
Frank Fat's Chinese restaurant in Sacramento, a two block walk from the state capitol build-
ing. Proud of his mastery of political demographics, Burton brazenly held late night sessions to
bargain over the shape of California's future congressional districts ...
When Burton finally unveiled his computer-drawn magic-what he called his 'contribution
to modern art'-politicians were struck dumb by his genius .... One district, drawn specifi-
cally for Burton's ally Howard Berman, was an incredible 385-sided figure that meandered
through most of the San Fernando Valley.
...Political scientist Bruce Cain has shown that Phil Burton's sessions at Frank Fat's
netted the Democrats at least five extra House seats.
Id.; Madigan, The Next Battle Lines are Beginning to Form, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 19, 1989, § 4,
at 1, col. 1, 7, col. 1:
[Michael] Madigan, now speaker of the Illinois House, recalled that the [1980 Illinois redis-
tricting] effort was a court battle of computers, with his computer eventually winning out
because he was able to constantly jiggle proposed congressional lines based on fresh, complete
information.
It was a genuine masterwork of redistricting.
One district alone, the 9th, snakes all the way up the lakefront into Evanston, over into
Morton Grove, then farther north a little bit-a fishhook filled with liberal Democrats proba-
bly guaranteeing the re-election of Democrat Sidney Yates until fate intervenes.
19. See Fund, supra note 18, at 35 (quoting "Screw the people!" as Assembly Speaker's response
to complaint about California Democrats' passage of redistricting plan modified only slightly from
previous plan rejected soundly by voter referendum); see also Review and Outlook: Caging the Gerry-
mander, Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1988, at 26, col. 1 [hereinafter Caging the Gerrymander] (describing
gerrymandered districts).
20. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
21. Cf. Balz, Redistricting Transformed by Computers: Technology Will Add Options-and
Complications-to Decennial Event, Wash. Post, June 12, 1989, at A17 ("Not so long ago, a grease
pencil, a hand-held calculator and the right political instincts were about all anyone needed in the
decennial battle of redrawing America's political districts."). But see Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109, 173 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that relevant factors
in adjudicating gerrymanders "include the nature of the legislative procedures by which the appor-
tionment law was adopted and legislative history reflecting contemporaneous legislative goals"); see
also Comment, 5upra note 7, at 221 n.221 and accompanying text (citing flaw of legislative procedure
in Bandemer redistricting case, and Justice Powell's notice of it). However, judicial regulation of the
legislative process used to adopt a redistricting plan is not the same as regulation of the process of line
drawing itself. Legislative approval of a redistricting plan may occur well after the lines of the plan
have been carefully gerrymandered.
22. Caging the Gerrymander, supra note 19, at 26, col. 1.
23. Id. (complaining that "[iun 1984, Republicans won 50.5% of [California's] U.S. House vote,
yet Democrats won 60% of the seats"). Although a party's percentage of votes is not likely to be the
same as the percentage of seats in a "first past the post" system, where the candidate winning the
most votes in a district wins the seat for the entire district, see Tufte, The Relationship Between Seats
and Votes in Two-Party Systems, 67 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 540 (1973), one would expect that "a party
that wins a majority of votes . . .[would win] an even larger majority of seats." Id. at 540; see also
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and for encouraging voter apathy,2 the Supreme Court has been charged
with encouraging gerrymandering by its choice of criteria in deciding re-
districting cases. For example, the Court's requirement of strict popula-
tion equality across districts has been credited with giving legislators a
free hand in drawing odd boundaries and an opportunity to justify gerry-
mandering.25 Gerrymandering has been associated with keeping discrete
and insular groups from gaining representation in legislatures.26 And after
more than twenty-five years of deciding redistricting cases, the Court is
still criticized, even by its own members, for failing to provide judicially
manageable standards for determining unconstitutional gerrymanders.2"
B. Proposals
A range of approaches to the problem of gerrymandering and the adju-
dication of redistricting cases has been proposed. Several commentators
have urged that the Court simply hold gerrymandering, or at least parti-
san gerrymandering, nonjusticiable.28 This view apparently rests on the
premise that potential abuses by legislators are preferable to the likely
untoward results of judicial intervention in the redistricting process. This
proposal, however, offers no solution to those disenfranchised by present
abuses in redistricting; eliminating judicial intervention seems particularly
risky in a system in which legislators can approve redistricting plans in
the face of overwhelming voter disapproval.2 9
Others have proposed improving redistricting by focusing on the politi-
cal process used in line drawing, suggesting a move to nonpartisan or bi-
partisan redistricting committees.30 While these proposals address the
Grofman, For Single-Member Districts Random Is Not Equal, in REPRESENTATION AND REDIS-
TRIcTING IssuEs 55, 55 (1982) (random districting will not equate percentage of seats with percent-
age of votes).
24. Caging the Gero'mander, supra note 19, at 26, col. 2 ("Voters respond to the lack of compet-
itive House elections by simply not voting in them. . . Far from avoiding their civic duty, many
voters have concluded that incumbent protections give House Members de facto lifetime tenure."); see
also Rosenbaum, It's a House of the Same Representatives, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1988, at El, col. 1,
E4, col. 4 (citing incumbent re-election rate as high as 98% in 1986 and noting rate has been charac-
terized as unhealthy). Despite public perceptions of problems in the incumbent re-election rate, the
Supreme Court has held that some incumbent protection is not an unconstitutional goal for political
redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983).
25. See Schuck, supra note 13, at 1328 & n.22. Requiring population equality in districts may
well add to opportunities to gerrymand because it is an incomplete standard. Cf Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. at 168 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("exclusive or primary reliance
on 'one person, one vote' can betray the constitutional promise of fair and effective representation by
enabling a legislature to engage intentionally in clearly discriminatory gerrymandering").
26. See Note, supra note 10, at 1290-91.
27. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 162 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
28. E.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 193-97 (2d ed. 1986) (expressing con-
cern that judicial intervention will lead to legitimation of gerrymandering); Schuck, supra note 13, at
1330, 1336-61 (suggesting dangers of partisan gerrymandering are overrated, and proposing thatjudicial alternatives are "unacceptable in practice, unworkable in principle, or both").
29. See supra note 19.
30. See B. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 181-91 (1984); Adams, A Model State Reap-
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problem of deliberate manipulation of redistricting by political parties,
they offer no real guidance to the committees on how to formulate accept-
able plans. Since no plan can be completely neutral, 1 it is necessary to
provide additional standards for the nonpartisan or bipartisan committees
to follow; the proposal on its own is incomplete. Another solution would
resolve redistricting cases by requiring full disclosure of subjective intent
on the part of legislators or redistricting committees; however, this re-
quirement has been viewed as totally impracticable.32
One commentator recently suggested that "the Court must focus more
on the objective standards of political gerrymandering, such as the com-
pactness concept advocated by Justice Powell.""3 If the current state of
redistricting is viewed as unacceptable then the development of objective
standards for redistricting is an important goal. However, mere advocacy
of the use of objective standards accomplishes nothing in the abstract. 4
What is needed is a proposed set of objective standards, or at least a mech-
anism which ensures the development, implementation, and review of a
workable set of standards.
II. AUTOMATED REDISTRICTING
In the past, "criteria of fair representation" have been offered as a
means of determining fair redistricting plans. 5 But much as principles of
portionment Process, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 825 (1977). But see Grofman, supra note 13, at 124
(calling Adams' proposal "naive and misguided").
31. See Dixon, The Court, the People, and "One Man, One Vote", in REAPPORTIONMENT IN
THE 1970s 7, 20 (N. Polsby ed. 1971) ("An astute member of an apportionment commission phrased
the matter this way a few years ago: 'Every plan has a political effect, even one drawn by a seventh
grade civics class whose parents are all nonpartisans and who have only the United States census data
to work with.'" (citation omitted)).
32. See Comment, supra note 7, at 222-28 (explaining "why an attempt to analyze the subjective
motivations of legislators is fraught with problems of proof").
33. Id. at 233. Compactness is a measure used to distinguish between, for example, districts
tightly packed around a central point-implying some degree of closeness between a representative
and his constituents-and thin districts which snake through a state. See, e.g., Hofeller & Grofman,
Comparing the Compactness of California Congressional Districts Under Three Different Plans:
1980, 1982, and 1984 (unpublished manuscript, 1987) (applying different measures of compactness
to districts in order to compare redistricting plans). Lack of compactness is often offered as evidence of
unconstitutional gerrymandering, based on the notion that long, snaky districts are more likely to
result when unfair gerrymanders occur. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("districts should be compact and cover contiguous
territory, precisely because the alternative, '[i]ndiscriminate districting,' would be 'an open invitation
to partisan gerrymandering'" (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578-79 (1964))). But see Low-
enstein & Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?,
33 UCLA L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1985) (citation omitted):
Is there any virtue in compactness as such, other than as a prophylactic? Precious little, under
modern conditions. Given modern methods of transportation and communication, the size or
shape of a district has little effect on the ability of the legislator to represent his or her constit-
uents . . . .Most of the more sophisticated writers on districting have recognized that the
presence or absence of compact districts does not assure either the presence or absence of ...
gerrymandering.
34. Cf Comment, supra note 7, at 233-37 (proposing development of objective standards to im-
prove redistricting adjudication, but offering no practical advice for implementation).
35. For example, one commentator describes 16 points as "criteria of fair representation" of
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flight cannot help people fly without a flying machine, criteria of fair
representation cannot improve redistricting until there is a way to use the
criteria affirmatively in drawing plans. This Note contends that improve-
ments in computer technology offer a new opportunity to use the com-
puter to "implement" the criteria of fair representation in redistricting.
Automated redistricting allows methodical redistricting using the criteria
of fair representation. The nature of computing also means that the pro-
cess used in automated redistricting becomes reviewable, since the com-
puter program used to create the plan can be made available to review-
ers.36 Once the redistricting process becomes both methodical and
reviewable, it will be possible to develop meaningful, objective standards
for legislative and judicial use in redistricting. The computer is not a mag-
ical instrument which will automatically generate "correct results" in the
redistricting process. However, by virtue of the explicitness required in
computer programming, the computer can be used as a tool to make pre-
viously articulated theories of representation practicable.
The use of automated computer models in redistricting implies an ac-
tive role for computers. That is, given a redistricting algorithm created for
the legislature, the computer would actually draw the lines which deline-
ate districts.3 7 In contrast, the present role of computers in redistricting is
which 13 directly affect redistricting:
1. Representation must be equal for each citizen [one person, one vote].. .. 2. The boundaries
dividing the electoral districts must coincide with local political boundaries as much as possi-
ble. 3. Electoral districts must be compact and contiguous. . . . 4. The boundaries . . . should
be drawn in such a way as to provide representation for political minorities . . . [and for 5.]
ethnic and racial minorities . . . . 6. The electoral system should not be biased in favor of any
political party . . . [or in favor of any 7.] racial or ethnic group . . . . 8. The electoral system
should have a wide range of responsiveness to changes in the electorate's party preferences.
[9. Tlhe rate at which a party wins seats per unit gain in the percentage of its vote should
be constant . . . . 10. There should be proportionality between the share of the seats won by
any particular ethnic or racial group and its vote share. . . . 11. The system should be compet-
itive . . . . 12. Each citizen should have equal power to affect the outcome of elections...
[and 13. elach citizen's vote should be 'used' as much as possible toward the election of a
candidate and the 'wasted' vote should be minimized ....
Lijphart, Comparative Perspectives on Fair Representation: The Plurality-Majority Rule, Geo-
graphical Dtstricting, and Alternative Electoral Arrangements, in REPRESENTATION AND REDIs-
TRICTING IssUEs, supra note 23, at 143, 145-46 (citation omitted). For other compilations of poten-
tial criteria, see Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 33, at 11, and Grofman, supra note 13, at 174.
Justice Powell, too, cites equality of population, compactness, contiguity, and adherence to political
boundaries as desirable neutral criteria for judging redistricting plans. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109, 167-68 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36. Previously, only the resulting map and perhaps the legislative process used to approve the
map would be available for judicial review. With automation, then, rather than having to glean the
subjective intention of legislators by analyzing redistricting maps, see Comment, supra note 7, at
187-88, 222-37, the Court will be able to analyze the objective "intent" of the redistricting procedure
as preserved in the record of the computer program.
37. For examples of active redistricting model proposals, see J. WEAVER, FAIR AND EQUAL Dis-
TRIcTs: A How-To-Do-IT MANUAL ON COMPUTER USE (1970), Nagel, supra note 11, and
Weaver & Hess, supra note 11. See also Brownstein, Spreading the Gain, 21 NAT'L J. 792, 794
(1989) (describing modified active role for computers: individuals draw lines but subject to strict al-
gorithmic constraints); Note, Simulated Annealing: An Improved Computer Model for Political Re-
districting, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. (forthcoming 1990) (explaining my proposal for new algorithm
for redistricting).
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a passive one, in which people draw lines and use computers only to keep
track of the population characteristics of districts."8 By shifting from a
passive to an active use of computers, review of the redistricting process
becomes manageable.3 9 Redistricting is achieved by programming the
computer with a relatively small amount of information. The programmer
must tell the computer how to redistrict, and this preprogrammed process
becomes reviewable.4" With the steps describing the process for redistrict-
ing saved in a computer program and available for public scrutiny and
judicial review, objective standards for reviewing redistricting plans can be
developed.4
Additionally, ideal "automated redistricting models" should produce
only a single plan of district boundary lines to be implemented in a state.
While it is possible that different states will develop radically different
computer programs for redistricting,42 a completely automated redistrict-
ing model is categorically distinguishable from other active uses of com-
puters in political redistricting, such as those methods which produce sev-
eral plans from which politicians can choose.4 Producing a single plan
imposes a high standard of disclosure and accountability. 4"
Automated redistricting might be challenged because of the difficulty of
38. See, e.g., Goddard, Gerrymandering by Computer, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 16, 1989, at
19 ("computer programs will allow legislators to fully manipulate election-district boundaries, getting
instant statistics on the voting behavior and racial composition of the people in the redrawn districts");
Fein, supra note 18; Balz, supra note 21 (describing how redistricter uses computer mouse and "elec-
tronic lasso" to select districts that computer then analyzes).
This type of passive computer use, along with its potential abuses, is particularly significant, as
computer use in the post-1990 redistricting is expected to be extensive. See, e.g., Barnes, Drawing the
Lines, 21 NAT'L J. 787 (1989); Barnes, Sharing the Pain, 21 NAT'L J. 795 (1989).
39. In contrast, passive computer use has no bearing on the subject of review in a gerrymandering
case. Where computers are used passively, courts are still left to review hand-drawn lines, and legisla-
tors still face the difficult task of explaining how the lines were drawn.
40. For an explanation of how automating the redistricting process turns redistricting goals into
computer terms, see sources cited supra note 37.
41. A range of objective standards reflecting the criteria of representation, supra note 35, might be
created by the courts, Congress, or the states. Questions including the following might be considered
when developing such standards: Can political data beyond that provided by the census be used? Can
racial data be employed? Must an objective of compactness be included? Contiguity? Can any stan-
dard be used? Can local political or racial groups be aggregated before the redistricting takes place?
Thus automating redistricting provides a means of using objective criteria as desired by Justice Pow-
ell. See supra notes 33 & 35. Standards might be created as per se rules requiring, for example, the
use of a compactness criterion. Or standards might be used to shift the burden of proof. For example,
preliminary aggregation of political groups might be used as prima facie evidence of unconstitutional
partisan gerrymandering, shifting the burden of proof of fairness to the legislators who drew the lines.
Perhaps the strongest support for the use of automated models would be the not inconceivable judicial
holding that nonautomated plans whose bases cannot be explained are per se arbitrary and capricious,
and thus invalid.
42. For examples, see sources cited supra note 37. These programs produce plans when given
input data such as census population and geographic information.
43. For an example, see Weaver & Hess, supra note 11, at 301-04.
44. If a politician were allowed to choose between two computer generated plans, then accounta-
bility would require full disclosure of the reasons for her choice, which involves problems of discern-
ing subjective motivations. See supra note 32. Generating a single plan means that the entire range of
choices that went into the model is built into the computer program, available for review by courts or
the public.
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working with criteria that are not only extensive, but also potentially con-
flicting.' 5 Regarding the complexity of the criteria, virtually any issue in
redistricting that can be handled manually can be included in an auto-
mated model."' The charge regarding the problem of conflicts in criteria is
similarly misplaced. If the criteria of fair representation conflict, this
problem inheres in the criteria themselves, not in automated redistricting.
Conflicting criteria may be resolved by assigning weights to the various
criteria, and thus should not preclude automated redistricting. Unlike
manual redistricting,4" 7 however, in which conflicts might be resolved on a
case-by-case basis according to the insights of the line drawer, 48 auto-
mated redistricting requires the plan for the resolution of differences to be
prepared in advance. Thus, creating a single redistricting algorithm for a
jurisdiction requires designers to build into the model tradeoffs of values,"9
resulting in some loss of flexibility.50 This loss of flexibility, however,
might also be viewed as a gain in uniformity and accountability.
A different problem arises from the amount of freedom that designers
have in creating the model. Presumably, just as they can manipulate lines
to reflect their interests, legislators could attempt to manipulate automated
redistricting by selecting weights which generate politically desirable re-
sults. In an automated process, however, legislators must discuss the crite-
ria of fair redistricting, and the weights assigned to those criteria, explic-
itly. Thus, they are to some degree accountable to the voters and the
courts in their decisions.
The criteria and weights chosen for the final redistricting program
45. For an explanation of the conflicts in redistricting criteria, see Lijphart, supra note 35, at
147-52.
46. See sources cited supra note 37. As a nonmathematical example, consider the case of a legisla-
tor who wants his donor or a family member to be placed in his district. Even this problem could be
"patched" into a computer program by a program line that does not allow certain data blocks to be
separated.
47. This category includes redistricting with a passive use of computers. See supra text accompa-
nying note 38.
48. For an example of how line drawers address their concerns on a case-by-case basis, see Fund,
supra note 18, at 35 (with census data available down to city block level, redistricters "can 'decide
[they] liked the demographics of people on one side of a street more than on the other and draw the
district line down the middle between them'" (quoting Republican National Committee consultant
Thomas Hofeller)).
49. For example, the computer might be directed to trade off a certain amount of compactness in
order to retain population equality. For more complete example of "values" to be traded, see supra
note 35.
50. Currently, flexibility takes the form of line drawers' ability to resolve conflicts on a case-by-
case basis. See, e.g., Grofman, supra note 13, at 124 ("[Reapportionment] involves the need to recon-
cile multiple and conflicting desirable social goals not all of which can simultaneously be achieved
* Because there is no simple algorithm by which some specified amount of one public good can be
equated with some specified amount of some other aspect of the public interest, the process of recon-
ciling and trading-off competing public values is an inherently political and appropriately legislative
task.").
Loss of flexibility from automating redistricting may occur not only within a given state at a given
time when redistricting occurs, but also temporally if no changes to the model are allowed over time
after the initial formulation. See infra text accompanying notes 51-52.
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should be made publicly available. With such information, it is likely that
the courts can develop standards to regulate the shape of the model. Re-
strictions on political and racial gerrymandering will also affect what
terms can be included in the model. However, the actual weights chosen
by legislators, as well as the measures used to define, say, compactness,
will likely be purely legislative decisions.
Safeguards can be built into the design process to alleviate some con-
cerns about automation. For example, a choice might be made to develop
a single computer model for a state to use every ten years without modifi-
cation, in order to reduce the risk of public perception of impropriety.5"
Concerns over the loss of flexibility resulting from reusing the same com-
puter model every ten years could be addressed by permitting occasional
changes to the model, through the use of periodic, binding plebiscites.
This technique allows legislators to campaign for or against changing the
model, but gives the final decision to the citizens, rather than to poten-
tially self-interested legislators.52
The actual design of the algorithm must also insure maximum fairness,
or perception of fairness. Fairness in determining the weights of conflict-
ing values could be protected by maintaining a record of why each term of
the model was chosen,53 and by limiting the type of data used in tests to
either old state data, out-of-state data, or artificial data.54 Further, the
51. Allowing legislators to decide on their own to change the model every 10 years could risk their
manipulation of the process, or would at least risk producing a public perception of unfairness. See
supra note 10.
52. Notice that plebiscites are necessarily one person, one vote. Thus, in a plebiscite, a disen-
franchised electoral majority can reassert itself. However, this may come at the expense of a disen-
franchised minority. See Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
1990). Examples of the use of plebiscites in redistricting include California's Proposition 118, on
California's June 1990 ballot, proposing that any state redistricting plan must be ratified by voters.
See Remap Process No Longer a Narrou, Political Concern, L.A. Times, Mar. 11, 1990, at Al, col.
5, A41, col. 4. But cf Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964),
aff[d in relevant part, vacated in part, 379 U.S. 693 (1965) (referendum on redistricting plan cannot
remedy violation of equal protection standards in case of malapportionment).
53. Developing a complete record explaining the basis for the construction of each portion of the
redistricting program would be desirable not only for the courts in the event of redistricting litigation,
but also for the public in general. This type of disclosure is typically used to explain the background
for technical-political decisionmaking. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(1)-(a)(3), 556(e), 557(c)-(d)
(1988) (portions of Administrative Procedure Act requiring records to be available to public, and
requiring all information used in administrative decision process to be available to public).
54. One may argue that using artificial data actually prevents model designers from creating the
best plan possible because it does not allow them to use the latest census and poll results for their
state. However, the goal of this requirement is to create a "veil of ignorance" for line drawers, in
order to give their computer program the highest possible presumption of fairness. See J. RAwLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971) (discussing veil of ignorance); Schuck, supra note 13, at 1349-56
(using Rawlsian approach to determine "fairness" goals of political redistricting). The suggestion may
even be seen as a permutation of Professor Amar's lottery voting proposal, because it forces legislators
to choose district maps from behind a veil of ignorance, ideally based on procedurally fair terms. See
Note, supra note 10, at 1294-95 & nn.68-74. But see Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 33, at
23-24 (claiming, without empirical support, that "neutral" redistricting processes serve to benefit
Republicans).
Artificial data have in fact been used in the past to study problems of representation in political
redistricting. See Grofman, supra note 23, at 55-56.
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algorithm could be designed by nonpartisan or bipartisan committees,5"
although this step should not be necessary if automating redistricting
makes legislators truly accountable in their decisions.
Even if the procedure used to design the redistricting algorithm is care-
fully planned to facilitate public scrutiny', computers cannot transform re-
districting into a "neutral" process. The resulting plan produced by the
model will not be neutral:56 It will reflect a particular weighing of con-
flicting values. As one commentator pointed out, it is difficult to specify
what a neutral solution to a gerrymandering problem might be, "because
there is no objective standard against which any redistricting can be com-
pared. '5 7 The advantage of automated redistricting lies in its ability to
expose the design process, rather than merely the results, to meaningful
scrutiny by the public and the courts.
III. COMPUTERS AND THE COURTS
Although the previous Section of this Note has suggested that auto-
mated redistricting can lead to the development and implementation of
objective standards in redistricting, it is important to examine how an au-
tomated process would accord with standards already set by the Supreme
Court. This Section will demonstrate that automated redistricting should
be well received by the courts, since providing a computer algorithm
which describes the redistricting process will ease the adjudication of ger-
rymandering disputes. The Supreme Court should be particularly amena-
ble to automated redistricting in view of the difficulties that have attended
its gerrymandering decisions.58
The Court's decision in Karcher v. Daggett9 illustrates its awkward
approach to gerrymandering cases. In that case, the Court invalidated a
New Jersey congressional districting plan with an average deviation from
perfect population equality of 0.1384%, even though this deviation is sta-
tistically insignificant when compared with expected errors in the cen-
sus.60 The result makes little sense until one reads Justice Stevens' con-
currence, which explains that the New Jersey plan appeared on its face to
55. Cf. supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing use of bipartisan or nonpartisan redis-
tricting committees).
56. See supra note 31.
57. Johnston, Constituen' Redistribution in Britain: Recent Issues, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND
THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 278 (1986); cf. Betts, Gerr'mandering Made Easy in 1990,
COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 28, 1989, at 1, 18 ("there is no such thing as a neutral election map" (citing
Kimball W. Brace, President, Election Data Services, Inc.)).
58. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) (maintaining that redistricting decisions would
not "ask the Court to enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are
lacking").
59. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
60. See 462 U.S. at 770 n.4 (White, J., dissenting); see also Note, supra note 15, at 687-89
(claiming strict, statistically insignificant standards like 0.1384% example of Karcher are
"inappropriate").
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be gerrymandered,6" a factor which the opinion of the Court seems to
ignore. A student of the Court can read the decision in Karcher as an
awkward attempt to find a way to avoid legitimating an egregious gerry-
mander.6 2 The Karcher decision, however, cannot provide useful stan-
dards for future line drawers if the written opinion does not reflect the
true grounds for the decision.
One also sees the Court struggling with gerrymandering in Davis v.
Bandener.6 3 That opinion had a majority as to one section, a plurality for
two other sections, two other concurrences as to the judgment, and one
concurrence in part and dissent in part.64 Overall, the Bandemer decision
did not even provide workable guidelines for determining whether a polit-
ical gerrymander was unconstitutional.65
It appears that the Court is -having difficulty with redistricting deci-
sions66 because gerrymandering cases at present fit almost perfectly the
mold of the classic "polycentric problem. ' 67 Professor Fuller explained
that
[w]e may visualize this kind of situation by thinking of a spider web.
A pull on one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pat-
tern throughout the web as a whole. Doubling the original pull will,
in all likelihood, not simply double each of the resulting tensions but
will rather create a different complicated pattern of tensions.6 8
To pinpoint a gerrymander, one must examine a complicated set of inter-
twined facts. The decisions made in this type of analysis will necessarily
affect political outcomes, possibly in unexpected ways, and factors con-
flated in a redistricting result cannot be separated as they can be when
looking at the terms included in a computer model.
Fuller described three alternatives which might arise when a court at-
tempts to address polycentric problems:
First, the adjudicative solution may fail. Unexpected repercussions
make the decision unworkable; it is ignored, withdrawn, or modified,
sometimes repeatedly. Second, the purported arbiter ignores judicial
proprieties-he 'tries out' various solutions in posthearing confer-
61. See 462 U.S. at 744-65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
62. Cf A. BICKEL, supra note 28, at 197 (expressing concern that judicial intervention will legiti-
mate gerrymandering).
63. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
64. See id. at 112.
65. See id. at 162 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Note, The Lack
ofJudicial Direction in Political Gerrymandering: An Invitation to Chaos Following the 1990 Cen-
sus, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1067, 1068-69 (1989) (claiming Bandemer fails to "provide sufficient guid-
ance to state legislators for the [post-1990] reapportionment").
66. For an extensive discussion of the problems in the Court's adjudication of gerrymandering
claims, see Note, supra note 65, at 1070-85.
67. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 394-404 (1978).
68. Id. at 395.
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ences, consults parties not represented at the hearings, guesses at
facts not proved and not properly matters for anything like judicial
notice. Third, instead of accommodating his procedures to the nature
of the problem he confronts, he may reformulate the problem so as
to make it amenable to solution through adjudicative procedures.69
One can easily see the threat of the first type of reaction to some of the
Supreme Court's decisions on redistricting. For example, unless the
Bandemer decision is supplemented by workable criteria, it may, as Jus-
tice O'Connor fears, "prove unmanageable and arbitrary.) 70
In contrast to the previous results-oriented approaches to redistricting
adjudication, a computerized redistricting process can serve to make this
polycentric problem amenable to court review. An automated process pro-
vides a court with a description of how and why district boundaries were
selected, at a level of detail that even full disclosure of intent under the
present system could never provide. Given a computer program and the
plan produced by it, a court could rule on straightforward questions, such
as whether it is allowable for those drawing lines to use political or racial
data in formulating a plan. 1 Judges could easily examine the redistricting
algorithm to observe whether the line drawers took into consideration cri-
teria such as compactness or adherence to political boundaries.72 The
availability of this type of judicially reviewable information could lead to
what Justice Powell had in mind in his Bandemer concurrence, when he
urged the development of judicially manageable standards to determine
"whether the boundaries of the voting districts have been distorted delib-
erately and arbitrarily to achieve illegitimate ends."73
Additionally, courts should prefer analyzing a redistricting procedure
written into computer models to requiring proportional representation,
which is the most common alternative given for managing the polycentric
69. Id. at 401.
70. 478 U.S. at 155 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71. See supra note 41. This amenability to judicial review does not answer the question of what
the Court might or should do when faced with an apparently straightforward use of harmless data
which is actually used as a proxy for covering up intentional, unconstitutional gerrymandering. It is
possible that such uses may be beyond judicial control; one might at most see discriminatory effects
used as evidence of intent, a method that the Court tends to use when assessing the actions of state
and local legislatures. See infra Section IV. Once a specific algorithm is officially adopted as a state's
redistricting method, however, the influence of the original designer will decrease over time as
demographics change, since the model will produce results that its creator could probably not have
anticipated. This time effect should reduce the incentive to create elaborate, subtle gerrymanders. In
addition, the fact that a model will be used more than once over time might discourage judges from
actively voiding computer terms which, though they may act as proxies in one year, might be indepen-
dently justifiable. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 139 (plurality opinion) ("mere lack of propor-
tionate results in one election cannot suffice [to show unconstitutional discrimination]").
72. The opportunity afforded judges by computer models to examine the terms used in redistrict-
ing can be viewed as a method which gives substance to the proposal that "the Court must focus more
on the objective standards of political gerrymandering, such as the ... compactness concept advocated
by Justicc Powell." Comment, supra note 7, at 233.
73. 478 U.S. at 165 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (construing Justice
Fortas' concurrence in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969)).
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problem of redistricting.74 While testing for proportional representation
would appear to be one means of providing a judicially manageable stan-
dard in gerrymandering cases, this type of representation has been
strongly opposed in the United States. For example, the Voting Rights
Act75 and the cases under it suggest that neither Congress nor the courts
view proportional representation as a fundamental right.76 Justice
O'Connor commented in her Bandemer opinion that requiring propor-
tionality "would be calamitous for the federal courts, for the States, and
for our two-party system."'7 7 In contrast, judges do not seem to be opposed
to looking at the process used to redistrict; Justice Powell has declared
that in gerrymandering cases, "a court should look first to the legislative
process by which the challenged plan was adopted.
78
Once one accepts that the use of computer models in redistricting might
be desirable from a judicial standpoint, a reexamination of the decision in
Karcher leads to a striking conclusion. The Court in Karcher, after strik-
ing down the New Jersey plan for failure to meet equal population stan-
dards, held that
[a]ny number of consistently applied legislative policies might justify
some variance [from perfect population equality], including, for in-
stance, making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries,
preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between
incumbent Representatives.79
This suggests that the Court has been looking for the exact kind of consis-
tency and accountability in redistricting that a computer model would
supply. An algorithm which focuses on a few redistricting criteria such as
compactness and contiguity, and explicitly contains an explanation of the
tradeoffs and procedures used in redistricting, could meet the require-
ments of the Court, even if it does not attain perfect equality across
districts.
74. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 13, at 1361-77 (describing "Siren's song of Proportional Repre-
sentation"); Comment, supra note 7, at 187 (describing Bandemer as "latest step in [the Court's]
progression toward proportional representation").
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982) (providing that "nothing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population").
76. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986) (acknowledging that "conjunction of
an allegedly dilutive electoral mechanism and the lack of proportional representation alone does not
establish a violation [of the Voting Rights Act]").
77. 478 U.S. at 155 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 175 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell probably did
not intend to require the legislative process used in redistricting to withstand scrutiny as strict as that
which a redistricting algorithm would survive, but this fact only improves the chances that an auto-
mated model would meet the Court's standards.
79. 462 U.S. at 740 (emphasis added).
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IV. AUTOMATED GERRYMANDERING AND THE INTENT/EFFECT
DICHOTOMY
In discussing how automated redistricting could meet the standards of
voters and the courts, this Note has not addressed the fact that in any
redistricting situation, the use of an automatic model might produce re-
sults that disproportionately favor or disfavor some group."0 According to
Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, racial gerrymandering is suspect in
its effects."' Any computer algorithm for redistricting must take this fact
into account.8 2 However, an analysis of case law suggests that this focus
on redistricting effects should be limited to the racial example. If an auto-
mated process is not designed to discriminate against a party in any state,
the focus of litigation should not be the resulting redistricting plan, but
rather whether the reviewable inputs to the model are defensible.8 3
In determining whether the effects of an automated plan should be a
consideration in the nonracial redistricting case, it is important to note
that it has been difficult for courts to examine redistricting plans for un-
constitutionally discriminatory effects. The Court in Thornburg v. Gin-
gles struggles to follow the Voting Rights Act's requirements without
resorting to a standard of proportional representation. 4 Although uncon-
stitutionality of effect is a difficult standard to apply, Justice O'Connor
explains that the "nexus between individual rights and group interests,
and the greater warrant the Equal Protection Clause gives the Federal
courts to intervene for protection against racial discrimination, suffice to
render racial gerrymandering claims justiciable." ' The Voting Rights Act
80. Consider, for example, a scenario in which politicians working on a redistricting model in-
cluded factors-of compactness, contiguity, and minority representation in their program, but did not
consider political party representation, and the resulting plan happened to pack all voters of one party
into a disproportionately small number of districts. Cf Dixon, Fair Criteria and Procedures for
Establishing Legislative Districts, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSuES, supra note 23,
at 7, 18-19 (then-Professor Robert Bork, as special master in redistricting case, inadvertently pro-
duced plan heavily favoring Democratic party despite use of essentially census data alone); R. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDuCTIoN OF THE LAW 88-89 (1990) (same).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). This provision essentially overturned the Court's decision in City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1979), which had held that unconstitutional discrimination requires a
showing of intent, id. at 55, suggesting that the new statutory rule cannot be treated lightly by the
Court.
82. For example, to withstand Court scrutiny, the computer model might need to use data that
has some units aggregated in advance, in order to guarantee adequate minority representation. Cf
United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1976) (allowing planners to try to attain 65% nonwhite
population in district). In an automated redistricting model, the prior aggregation of voters by race
will be reviewable by the courts. The courts will therefore be able to develop meaningful, objective
standards regarding acceptable aggregation in the redistricting process.
83. Consider, for example, the case in which plans drawn with townships as the smallest indivisi-
ble units tend to favor Party A whereas plans splitting up townships tend to favor Party B. In this
example, it should be the choice of data used, rather than the results, which must be justified. If, for
example, the State's model, using census units much smaller than townships, appears consistently to
favor Party B, then it can be argued that it is the township boundaries that are unfair, rather than the
redistricting scheme.
84. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
85. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 151 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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finds that protection against discriminatory effect is necessary to aid in the
effort to avoid retrogression of minority representation. O'Connor, how-
ever, states that an effects test should not be applied to political
gerrymandering.8 6
Because political gerrymandering may be suspect only in its intent, an
automated process which could meet the Court's standards might be ac-
ceptable even if the political results occasionally appear skewed. For ex-
ample, Justice Powell in Bandemer states that gerrymandering is "the
deliberate and arbitraty distortion of district boundaries and populations
for partisan or personal political purposes."8 " This implies that the Court
might use a process-oriented approach to determine unconstitutional polit-
ical gerrymandering; if the automatic model is not designed to discrimi-
nate,8" then the Court might uphold its results regardless of their political
effects.89 At most, effects might be used as evidence of intent, a method
that the Court sometimes uses to examine the constitutionality of actions
of state and local legislatures."
Automated redistricting is suited for separating intent from effect in re-
districting in a way previously impossible, since it can make available
records of exactly why lines were drawn where.9 The Supreme Court,
too, in explaining that "a finding of unconstitutionality [in political gerry-
mandering] must be supported by evidence of continued frustration of the
will of a majority of the voters,"9 implies that it might be willing to
accept the use of an automated model even if the model's results occasion-
ally seem skewed. There is no reason to expect that a computer model
should consistently or unfairly favor one party over another.9
The difficulty one faces in trying to determine whether a plan is uncon-
stitutional based on its results might suggest that the appropriate test of a
gerrymander should in fact focus on the process used to redistrict. Perhaps
observers have had difficulty objectively defining a gerrymander exactly
because their focus on results has been misguided. Maybe, as Powell im-
plies, a "gerrymander" must be by definition deliberate. The use of auto-
mated computer models, then, by facilitating judicial review of the redis-
tricting process, might be one of the only ways of promoting fairness in
redistricting.
86. Id. at 161.
87. Id. at 164 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Kirkpatrick v. Preis-
ler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969)) (emphasis added).
88. But see supra note 71 (describing potential danger of discrimination by proxy).
89. In contrast, the court might find that the existence of a political packing term in the algorithm
is either per se illegal, or else that it shifts the burden of proof of fair redistricting to the proponents of
a challenged plan. See supra note 41.
90. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 277 (11th ed. 1985).
91. See supra Section II.
92. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986).
93. But cf. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 33, at 23-24 (claiming "neutral" redistricting
processes serve to benefit Republicans).
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V. PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF FIXED MATHEMATICAL AND PROCESS-
ORIENTED STANDARDS IN POLITICAL PROBLEMS
Despite the theoretical benefits of automated redistricting, individuals
may still hesitate to accept the creation of a single computer program that
affects political outcomes by taking political values, such as tradeoffs be-
tween compactness and equality of population, out of the hands of people
and fixing them over time. However, a look at some major processes re-
lated to voting, including the reapportionment problem, the "one person,
one vote" rule, and the "first past the post" system of single member dis-
tricting, suggests that people have instead widely accepted several fixed
mathematical techniques which have had major political consequences.
The reapportionment problem provides perhaps the best example of the
use and acceptance of a fixed mathematical technique in the political
arena."' The task of reapportionment is to assign congressional seats to
states. The necessity of assigning seats based on the census was one of the
first items covered in the Constitution,95 yet no method was mandated by
the Framers. Many different mathematical reapportionment techniques,
each of which would lead to different political outcomes, are possible."
Some countries do not even use a mathematical technique to reapportion
and instead rely upon negotiation.9" Yet this country has accepted the
choice of a single method to allocate seats given census data, without
human intervention.
Both reapportionment and redistricting affect political outcomes, and
both require tradeoffs of conflicting values. The choice of reapportionment
method may be used, for example, to discriminate consistently against
larger states, as the current method presently does.98 Additionally, the re-
sults of reapportionment, like those of redistricting, can be quite signifi-
cant. For example, just as redistricting can affect the political makeup of
Congress,99 reapportionment can affect presidential elections.100 And like
redistricting, reapportionment can affect the over- or under-representation
of rural or urban voters in legislatures.' ° "The fact is that political real-
94. For a comparison of reapportionment and redistricting from a political science perspective
rather than a process-oriented perspective, see Edwards, Theoretical and Comparative Aspects of
Reapportiopnent and Redistricting: With Reference to Baker v. Carr, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1265
(1962).
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (providing for decennial census and congressional apportionment
based on results).
96. For example, Webster's method, Hamilton's method, Jefferson's method, and the "method of
equal proportions." See generally M. BALINSKI & H. YOUNG, FAIR REPRESENTATION: MEETING
THE IDEAL OF ONE MAN, ONE VOTE (1982).
97. For example, France and England. Id. at 3.
98. See id. at 4.
99. See Rosenbaum, supra note 24, at El, col. 1.
100. See, e.g., M. BALINSKI & H. YOUNG, supra note 96, at 2-3 (1982) (malapportionment of
1870's led to electoral college which made Rutherford B. Hayes President although opponent won
51.6 percent of vote).
101. Compare id. at 2-3 (one danger of reapportionment "is a significant shift of seats from small
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ists from Alexander Hamilton in 1792 to Arthur Vandenberg in 1941
have engaged in bitter conflicts over methods of apportionment whose ef-
fects were to transfer as few as one seat."10 2 Reapportionment is not a
trivial political problem; indeed, redistricting and reapportionment are
closely related. If any state loses or gains even one congressional seat due
to a post-census reapportionment, the boundaries of every single district in
the state may change.1" 3
Given the similar magnitude of the political effects of reapportionment
and redistricting solutions, the widespread acceptance of the use of a
mathematical process over a technique of negotiation in reapportionment
suggests that the development of a computer program to solve the redis-
tricting problem may also be well received by voters. It is likely that reap-
portionment is accepted as a mathematical process because it has already
been implemented as such; many of the alleged representational or politi-
cal differences between reapportionment and redistricting might appear
either artificial or less significant if a redistricting algorithm were actually
implemented in one or more jurisdictions.
A second example of a widely accepted mathematical standard used in
politics is the "one person, one vote" rule first enunciated in the Reynolds
decision.10 The Constitution requires no such standard of representation,
and calls for the creation of a Senate which blatantly violates the one
person, one vote rule. 10 5 Additionally, Professor Ely argues that the only
obvious benefit of the rule is its simplicity, and that the Court might have
constitutionally allowed rural districts to be given disproportionately high
representation.' 6 Yet the one person, one vote standard proved "so attrac-
tive in its manifest simplicity and in its congruence with commonsense
notions of fair representation"'0 7 that it has apparently received the wide-
spread support of the public. One wonders if the use of computer models
in redistricting might gain similar acceptance by the voters.
The "first past the post" (FPP) system of voting"'0 used in American
single member districting also represents a fixed standard accepted in the
political arena even though it is imperfect, it is not the only process possi-
ble, and its use has important political repercussions. For example, FPP
rural states to large industrial states-or the reverse-depending upon the method used") with A.
BICKEL, supra note 28, at 189-90 (impetus for redistricting cases originally involved disparity in
representation of urban and rural voters).
102. M. BALINSKI & H. YOUNG, supra note 96, at 3 (emphasis added).
103. In fact, the loss of a congressional seat in a state should change every district in the state
according to the current population equality standards required by the Supreme Court, except in the
rare case where every district has naturally lost the same number of people.
104. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
105. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (providing that "Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State . . . and each Senator shall have one Vote").
106. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusr 121 (1980).
107. Schuck, supra note 13, at 1381.
108. See definition supra note 23.
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virtually guarantees a disparity between votes and seats in districts,1"9 yet
proportional representation as an alternative is opposed,' and multi-
member districting and at-large elections are often challenged as discrimi-
natory,1" while FPP is accepted as the norm.
These examples of widely accepted, fixed approaches to political and
specifically voting-related problems suggest promise for the use of an au-
tomatic method to redistrict states." 2 While politicians might initially re-
sist the development of a computer program to redraw district bounda-
ries," 3 and political scientists might try to distinguish redistricting from
other types of fixed "mathematical" processes in voting," 4 a model once
selected may receive widespread popular support.
VI. CONCLUSION
Supreme Court redistricting decisions, like Baker v. Carr"5 and Reyn-
olds v. Sims,"6  have radically changed approaches to redistricting." 7
Therefore, now that the Davis v. Bandemer" decision has found politi-
cal gerrymandering to be justiciable for the first time, it is likely that the
redistricting process will change again in the future." 9 Anticipating this
potential for change after the 1990 census, individuals should realize that
it is time to start rethinking the possibility of designing and implementing
an automated computer model for political redistricting.
This Note has not argued that developing a new computer model for
redistricting would be easy. Creating a state-of-the-art redistricting model
109. See supra note 23.
110. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (plaintiffs claim at-large election scheme
dilutes Black voting power); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plaintiffs claim Mobile,
Alabama's practice of at-large elections for City Commissioners dilutes Black voting power); White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (plaintiffs claim multi-member districts are invidiously discriminatory
against racial or ethnic groups).
112. Other widely accepted "mathematical" standards accepted in the political arena despite their
problems include the draft and jury lotteries. See Note, supra note 10, at 1289 & nn.36-38. This high
level of acceptance has occurred even though, as in the previous examples, the process has been far
from perfect. See Gleick, The Quest for True Randomness Finally Appears Successful, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 19, 1988, at Cl, col. 3, C8, col. 4 ("[Only after the draft lottery] did statisticians establish that
the procedure had been far from random; people born toward the end of the year had a far greater
chance of being drafted than people born in the early months. In general, the problem of mixing or
stirring or shuffling things to insure randomness is more complicated than most experts assume.").
113. Opposition may arise because such a technique would both take away power from legislators
and force legislators to be accountable in their choices of redistricting criteria.
114. See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 31, at 10-11 ("Legislative elections and the party system which
organizes them are critical parts of the American process of political representation. We expect far
more from the election system than mere filling of legislative seats.").
115. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
116. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
117. Prior to these decisions, "very few State Legislatures were following a really good faith effort
at redistricting themselves following each census." COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note
17, at 10. Since Baker and Re)nolds, states are held to very high redistricting standards. See cases
cited supra note 3.
118. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
119. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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will require efforts from politicians and political scientists as well as from
computer scientists. Battles over values to be embedded in the model may
in fact resemble previous lengthy battles over final redistricting plans.
Further, this Note has not attempted to suggest which values might be
acceptable in such a model. This Note has explained, though, that some
unique, process-oriented benefits would result from making political redis-
tricting an automated process.
Ultimately, this Note challenges readers to see political redistricting as
a case in which "the existence of a clear rule or an unambiguously func-
tioning institution may . . . be more important than the content of the
rule or design of the institution."' 120 The clear rule or institution here is
the computer program which would apply the redistricting algorithm for a
jurisdiction every ten years without pause. The benefit of having a consis-
tent method of determining district lines quickly, without court challenges,
makes automated redistricting an important goal for the near future.
Is automated redistricting a misguided attempt to "take the politics out
of politics?" Well, in the final analysis, what is politics? When the foun-
ders of this country designed the political institutions standing today, they
worked with the understanding that "[ilf men were angels, no government
would be necessary."'' Accordingly, they created a government as a sys-
tem of checks and safeguards, designed to protect our safety and well-
being. "Politics" must take place within the constraints of this governmen-
tal structure. With today's technological power, we have the ability to
raise politics to a level never previously imaginable, since automated redis-
tricting can be used to create a new framework within which legitimate
debate can occur. Perhaps, then, automated redistricting should really be
seen as an effort to "put good politics back into politics."
120. Simon, The.Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be
Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1482, 1525 (1985) (discussing "rule-of-law virtues").
121. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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